

## THE ASIAN SECURITY — PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

### I. Introduction

The Vietnam War was over at the cost of the American debacle out of the Indochina Peninsula. However, intense Sino-Soviet rivalry has helped to limit the damage to the United States and other Western states. Three Communist centers are now competing for power in Southeast Asia — Peking, Moscow and Hanoi — and, China and North Vietnam, with the latter greatly strengthened by its victory in South Vietnam, have started a new competition for influence in Cambodia, in Laos and in Thailand. Of course, long-term consequences are still vague and every analyst are reluctant to conclude the future of this region. The situation in the region as well as in Asia/Pacific area is very ambiguous and fluctuating according to the shifts of power balance.

It is probably true to say that the post—World War II era of international politics, dominated by the primacy and centrality of American-Soviet conflicts, has ended. However, it is probably regarded as an over-estimate to say that Asia has replaced Europe as the locale of conflicts potentially most dangerous to international order. But, it is not probably faulty to conclude that the promotion both of international stability and of social progress in Asia urgently requires the fostering of deliberate political consultations — and eventually of political cooperation — between the three regions of global community, namely America, Europe and Asia, because of the greatly interacted world politics today.

In this regard, several sets of international relationships are relevant to the Asian and Pacific region: (1) the US-USSR-China, (2) the US-Japan-West European triad, and (3) the quadrangle involving the United States, China, Japan and USSR. While the US-USSR-China triad is the dominant power relationship at present, the new quadrangular relationship has become equally significant in this region nowadays. With the rising of Hanoi and emergence of nuclearized New Delhi, new sub-power centers are likely to be formed in this region. But, the Asian people can not get away still from the framework of the above international relationships.

However, here is one thing very important which we have often forgotten. It is the question: what is Asia? »Asia« is a geographical

concept, it is neither a political nor a cultural identity. Asia is not unintegrated region like Europe consisting of independent, advanced or relatively advanced nations. Relations among Asian nations are quite complicated and confusing. The total population is 1.8 billion, 52 percent of the world's population. This populace is divided in more than 20 nations and protectorates. Each of five nations — China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Japan — has more than 100 million people and fairly poor economically except few countries. Asia lacks the closeness which makes the formation of a region of neighbors easy. Geographical features hinder Asia from being integrated.

Such being the situation in Asia — ambiguous, diversified, confusing, less self-reliant and too selfish — what are the problems for Asian people to solve and how is the future for Asian security, stability, and prosperity? And, what is the Japan's role as the most advanced nation in this region for this purpose. These are the topics the writer tries to present in this paper. However, this paper is neither academic nor scientific, but a very informal private view as an instinctive observer of Asian situation. Further, I would like to remind the readers that I am presenting this paper not as an official faculty member of the National Defense College but as a private party trying to be as objective as possible.

## II. Systemic Considerations

The bipolar international system of the 1950's and 1960's has been gradually yet unevenly transformed into a multipolar system in which the five dominant, but unequal and asymmetrical power centers are the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Western Europe and Japan. However, the distribution of power among the five major powers will not approach symmetry during the remainder of the 1970's or even in the 1980's. Bipolarity will continue to dominate global power relationships, and it is highly improbable that by 1980 either China or Japan will be able to match the United States or the Soviet Union in tangible political and military capabilities, even though the capacity of China to inflict destruction of the Soviet Union will increase substantially.

As stated in the introduction, the following three sets of international relationships are determinant for the Asian stability and security. (1) the US-USSR-China, (2) the US-Japan-West European triad, and (3) the US-USSR-China-Japan quadrangle. While the US-USSR-China triad is still the dominant power relationship at present, the new quadrangular relationship has become equally significant in the Asian and Pacific system. Negotiations and accommodation among the members of these major power sets are constrained by varying degrees of lingering historical adversary rela-

tionships. However, the evidence and analysis indicate that adversary constraints impelled by ideological motivations have at a considerable prompt tempo decreased among states in the Asian and Pacific system, including possibly a diminution, but not elimination, of Sino-Soviet hostility. This general tendency has been accompanied by a diffusion of power among the middle class and smaller powers outside American control as they move away from past alignments. In turn, each of the three major nuclear powers — the Soviet Union, China and the United States — attempts to prevent the others from centering into alliances with outside powers and tries to weaken opposing alliances which now exist.

The number of military power centers, as well as the disparities between them, have appreciably changed in South Asia (with India's defeat of Pakistan and her nuclear test) and in Southeast Asia (with the emergence of North Vietnam as perhaps the strongest local power and the disastrous defeat of South Vietnam). However, elsewhere in Asia military relationships have not appreciably changed, despite China's efforts to improve its military prowess, and the asymmetrical power capabilities within the Moscow-Peking-Washington triad are not likely to be substantially altered before the 1980's. Japan will not opt for large-scale conventional or nuclear rearmament during this decade, or even in a foreseeable future, a move of which would, of course, radically alter the distribution of regional power. Another factor affecting regional stability, the presence of aggressive states in the area, has been somewhat reduced in saliency, although perhaps only temporarily, by the Indochina settlement, though still uncertain, and by China's cooperative, or at least less overtly hostile, policies. The danger of conflicts in Korea and over Taiwan is offset to some degree by the decrease in belligerency on the part of China toward the non-Communist world.

Among other elements conducive to regional stability is the number of core states which have strong identification with states or organizations outside the Asian and Pacific system. This factor has increased significantly in importance with China's entry into the United Nations, with India's alignment with the USSR, with Japan's interest in greater bilateral US-West European-Japanese collaboration, and with indications of more independent and broader Indonesian and Australian policies in the future. Finally, the US-USSR and US-Chinese detentes have tended to be accompanied by an increase in cooperation within the Asian and Pacific system, notably in the numbers of trade, air line and other technical agreements with China by non-Communist states. Increasing cross-national cooperative interactions between the middle class powers and the major powers, and between China and actors outside, the region are seen. Major conflict between India and China is not likely so long as China remains apprehensive of the Soviet Union and India continues her alliance with Moscow.

The coincidence and intensity of the above factors lead to the conclusion that overall systemic stability (i. e., the absence of military conflict situations directly involving the US, USSR, China, or Japan) in the Asian and Pacific region may increase moderately in late—1970's to in early—1980's in comparison with the 1960's. The tendency toward possible greater systemic stability at the major power lever, however, will probably not be reflected at lower levels where clashes among middle class and smaller powers and recurring domestic instability can be anticipated. Recurring conflict is projected in particular throughout Indochina Peninsula where ideological antagonisms will remain a significant issue. Elsewhere, potential clashes will be primarily nationalistic in character, although both the Soviet Union and China may give military assistance to insurgencies, especially if such aid does not escalate to direct confrontation with another major power.

As the United States has reduced its forward presence in Asia, domestic instability has increased among several of its allies (the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea) accompanied by instances of growing authoritarians (in South Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore).

The growth of Japanese economic power and the increased economic dependence of many countries on Japan is an ambivalent factor, which also could adversely affect stability since it causes serious resentment against the Japanese, and which weakens diversification of Japanese national economies, thereby inhibiting regional integrative initiatives. Japan will probably continue to increase its economic influence in all of non-Communist Asia, but especially in Southeast Asia, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia.

### **III. Destabilizing Factors in Asian and Pacific Basin**

Furthermore, many underlying destabilizing factors endemic to the Asian and Pacific region will persist. These factors include the absence of broadly-based regional international organizations which can mediate tensions or maintain balances. Tendencies toward political fluidity or »Balkanization« among smaller powers are accentuated by the fact that functional integration among countries participating in regional institutions (ASPAC, ASEAN, SEATO, etc.) is not matching the pace of increasing diplomatic interactions and regional demands.

The emerging pattern of multilateral diplomacy throughout the region is characterized by the increased number and scope of bilateral interactions in which non-Communist nations are moving separately to normalize relations, including the conclusion of formal agreements with Communist states. Thus, a multicentered and na-

tionalistic pluralism, rather than a movement toward regionalism, characterizes cross-national interactions among the middle class and minor powers of the region for at least the remainder of the 1970's. An additional characteristic is an increased saliency of middle class powers (India, Indonesia and North Vietnam) in influencing systemic developments.

The mounting complexity of interactions at all levels throughout the region generates problems which in turn tend to compromise the sovereignty of individual states. Consequently, the regional environment of traditional jurisdictions and linkages becomes less defined as distinction between domestic and foreign issues becomes increasingly blurred. The middle and minor powers find it more advantageous to maintain relations with as many large powers as possible instead of identifying with one power or bloc. At all levels in the system, manoeuvrability is enhanced by skilful diplomacy backed by a variety of national assets which include, but are not confined to, military capabilities.

The prospects for avoidance of an Asian war involving the major powers are not likely in comparison with conditions during the 1960's, even though the possibility of a Sino-Soviet military confrontation has not been totally removed as a result of the emerging Sino-American relationship. There will be recurring instability in Indochina, continuing Sino-Soviet conflict at the diplomatic level at least until leadership changes occur both in Moscow and or Peking, growing Japanese political as well as economic power without a concurrent expansion of military power, and a diffusion of power throughout the subsystem as old alliances and regional groupings will erode and evolve into new forms. The new multilateralism may facilitate a widening great power detente, but may also induce new localized conflicts in which ideological cleavages are less sharp.

While the schism between China and the Soviet Union has afforded the United States opportunities to reduce its military presence in Asia, Sino-Soviet antipathy could cause greater competition between Moscow and Peking at the national levels throughout the region where its disruptive effects may add to local instabilities and hinder regional integrative efforts, especially in the absence of US power as a stabilizing influence.

#### IV. The Sino-Soviet Dispute

The low likelihood of all-out war between China and USSR does not mean, however, that the confrontation between the two Communist rivals will dwindle. Particularly, as the Chinese develop an increasingly credible second-strike capability against targets in the European sector of the Soviet Union, not only Soviet apprehensions will rise, but the Soviet nuclear »deterrent« will be devalued and

the latitude for conventional conflict will widen. Moreover, in the event the Soviet-American Treaty of 1972 limiting ABM deployment remains in force throughout this period, the Chinese strategic nuclear capability will be correspondingly enhanced. To cope with the perceived threat, a substantial number of Soviet forces, equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, will remain stationed on the Sino-Soviet border. And, Soviet Union will probably establish a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean to remind China that its southern frontiers and coastal areas are also vulnerable to Soviet attack.

Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, a force which grew to approximately thirty ships in the fall of 1973, will also serve to undergird Soviet diplomatic maneuvers aimed at establishing an anti-Chinese Asian collective security system around China's rim. The Soviet proposal for such a system will be accompanied by Soviet pressure on weaker Asian states to conclude bilateral friendship treaties resembling the Indo-Soviet friendship pact signed just prior to the Indo-Pakistan War in 1971. Those Asian states successfully resisting Soviet entreaties may nevertheless find it in their interest to accept Soviet military assistance and economic aid, particularly if the United States is perceived by these countries as abandoning its leading role in the Pacific.

Soviet efforts to obtain Japanese (and US) investment in fuel resource developments in Siberia in exchange for long-term oil and gas deliveries serves a strategic as well as economic purpose from Moscow's standpoint. If successful in attracting foreign investment, the Soviet plan will create a vested interest on the part of Japan and the United States in the stability of Soviet Siberia. Indeed, if US and/of Japan have a long-term major investment in a trans-Siberian fuel pipeline which passes close to the Chinese border, it will be in their interest to dissuade or try to prevent China from causing serious conflicts along the border. In the coming decade, it is highly probable that the Soviet Union will continue its policy of encirclement, containment, and isolation of China. China will not only exert great efforts to gain friends and increase its influence in the Pacific Basin but will probably try to restrict Soviet freedom of action in other ways. The Chinese will encourage East European aspirations for greater independence from the Soviet Union, particularly in the cases of Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia. Chinese diplomacy will also seek to spur greater West European economic, military and political integration while seeking to dissuade the NATO countries from reducing their forces in Europe in order to distract Soviet military forces and pressures from the Sino-Soviet frontier.

In a similar vein, Peking will continue to warn the Arab countries not to become dependent on Soviet military and diplomatic assistance, although China will have little to offer as a substitute in the coming years. Finally, so long as the Sino-Soviet split persists at a

high level of tension, the Chinese will limit their efforts to have the U.S. withdraw all of the forces from the Asian and Pacific region.

China will pursue improved bilateral relations with major Asian powers as a means of countering Moscow, if circumstances appear propitious. Japan's evident interest in expanding its ties with Peking will facilitate this strategy in East Asia. In South Asia, India's close relationship with the Soviet Union, and China's ties with Pakistan will constrain but not preclude the Chinese from scoring similar success with New Delhi. Using Pakistan as an intermediary, China and Iran may will establish closer ties in the near future.

China's evident interest in improving its state-to-state relations with US and other Pacific powers will not remove Peking's support of revolutionary movements among Southeast Asian nations, particularly those maintaining close relations with US. Some countries in this area may continue to experience some form of Chinese-backed revolutionary movements in the balance of the decade, but probably no to the degree encountered in the 1960's as Peking improves its state-to-state relations with incumbent governments.

China's lower commitment in the early 1970's to promoting revolutionary change cannot be assured beyond the present Chinese leadership. Nevertheless, the Vietnam War, which had involved both the Soviet's and the Chinese aiding a common ally, underscored the extend to which their national rivalry might promote international instability. Against this backdrop it is necessary for them to assess the prospects for increased Sino-Soviet cooperation in future. It is evident to all parties involved that the Sino-Soviet rift benefits neither China nor the Soviet Union, but only the United States. The likely disappearance from the scene in this time period of Secretary Brezhnev (68), Chairman Mao (81), and Premier Chou (75), will remove a large element of personal rivalry from Sino-Soviet relations. As a result, there are opportunities for new leaders in either China or the Soviet Union to reduce, but probably not eliminate, past animosities between the two Communist states. The possibility of such efforts should not be excluded from the analysis of Moscow-Peking relations.

## V. The New Role of China

The new Chinese foreign policy, characterized by widening detente between China and the non-Communist world, is a trend which we believe will continue throughout the remaining 1970's or at least during the tenure of the present Chinese leadership. Chinese foreign policy appears aimed at achieving a stable distribution of countervailing power in the Asian and Pacific system, including US support, in order to restrain the Soviet Union from aggression against China.

Such a policy amounts to Chinese acceptance of great power multipolarity and state-to-state diplomacy among lesser powers in the international system. The new Chinese diplomacy in the Asian and Pacific system will encourage less hostile relations between other nations and Peking. Tensions will be reduced between China and other Asian and Pacific nations, including Taiwan, but excluding USSR. Peking will focus on aligning the Third World nations and support in the United Nations against the two superpowers, notably in the extension of territorial waters and in disarmament agreements.

Since the late 1960's China has passed through a period of intense domestic consolidation. The emergence of a moderate contrast leadership under Mao and Chou has provided a somewhat improved internal political stability against a backdrop of improving economy. Therefore, the possibility exists that an orderly transition after Mao's (or Chou's) death to a collective Politburo leadership may occur, in which case the overall revisionist trend of Chinese accommodation with the non-Communist world may continue.

Revisionism in Chinese policy does not exaggerate the role of military build-up. Ideology will not be entirely sacrificed, and Chinese thinking in foreign policy will be dominated by a tendency to subordinate military and economic matters to broader political considerations in which doctrinal matters will play some role. In addition, Chinese policy can be expected to continue to encompass a variety of traditional approaches, including alliances, united fronts and people-to-people diplomacy and formal diplomacy.

The visit of President Nixon to China in 1972 was both a result of Peking's new orientation as well as catalyst to further Chinese cooperation with the United States to restrain the Soviet Union, improve China's status, and consolidate the legitimacy of the Peking leadership. On the hand, the Nixon Doctrine also has provided China greater leverage in its united front efforts in the United Nations and among the medium-sized and small powers of the Third World against both superpowers.

Heightened Chinese interest in importing Western technology to build a sophisticated defense system and to modernize the economy should also result in closer Sino-Japanese relations, even though Japanese hopes of huge exports to China seem exaggerated. The growing economic influence of Japan does not constitute a threat to China, as long as Japan does not opt for nuclear arms or an alliance with USSR as a replacement for a diminishing American security guarantee. China will be unable to compete Japan economically, and, because of its preoccupation with USSR, can be expected not to act as a direct strategic military threat or hostile political adversary to Japan.

India's lingering border dispute with China and the closeness of Indo-Soviet ties should not prohibit eventual normalization of Pe-



king-Delhi relations in a visible future. If Hanoi would utilize the Indochinese situation to unify Vietnam with the aid of the Soviet Union, the resulting dominance of Indochina by a strong, pro-Soviet North Vietnam would not be in China's interest. Therefore, Peking may continue tacitly to encourage maintenance of the Indochinese status quo and creation of an acceptable status quo in South Asia and Southeast Asia.

A slow amelioration in tensions, but not a rapprochement, will probably characterize Peking-Moscow relations for the coming decade, presuming continuing Soviet military restraint. Peking appears to have accepted a defensive, regional military parity with Moscow as a form of deterrence in preference to attempting to gain superiority in global strategic or ideological terms. Despite the adversary relationship between Peking and Moscow, the pattern of increasingly cooperative interactions among nations in the Asian and Pacific subsystem should therefore be tangibly enhanced by China's new diplomacy.

## VI. The Impact of the Nixinger Diplomacy

What the Nixon Doctrine meant to most Asian nations was that the military and political capabilities of the United States in Asia had peaked, and would become a less and less significant factor in Asian politics in 1970's. Therefore, the role of the United States in opposing Communist expansion in Asia was significantly reduced. Asian nations also detected a weakened American will in the calculated indeterminacy with which the Nixon Doctrine had been implemented. With the improved Sino-American relationship and the increasingly inward focus of American domestic politics, US military commitments to Asian nations have appeared on the wane.

In those states for whom the US presence or the US security guarantee (or both) represented the core of their security, the future looks somber if China should return to its earlier belligerency. They will have to pay for more of their own defense; probably a less effective defense at that. Japan's potential economic, political and military role in Asia is feared by many. Thus many smaller states are apprehensive of joining regional security arrangements in which Japan would inevitably assume a dominant role. The end of the US military participation in the Vietnam War and the subsequent reduction (or withdraw) in US troop strength in Southeast Asia have also uniformly provoked apprehension in the capitals of US-Asian allies. For these allies, less able to depend on US aid in a national emergency, efforts to broaden their diplomatic posture are becoming a necessity. Normalization of relations with Communist nations is occurring, has occurred, most visibly in various countries,

including Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan, and to a lesser extent, South Korea, Taiwan and elsewhere.

The Southeast Asian link in the increasingly attenuated pattern of American deterrence is the weakest, and depends most upon the viability of US allies as well as the capacity of USSR and China to inhibit North Vietnam's aggressiveness. For some states, like Sri Lanka and Australia, it means acceptance of increased Chinese influence in the region; for some like Malaysia and Taiwan it means an attempt to forge a closer countervailing relationship with the Soviet Union; for Indonesia and Singapore it means efforts toward effective neutralization for their territory. A movement by the smaller states toward an anti-Chinese military alliance, as originally proposed in the Nixon Doctrine, has not developed. Instead, bilateral accommodations with China have been the norm.

For nearly all countries, the Nixon Doctrine meant a decrease in US economic assistance which had served to restrain some of the Japanese economic dominance of Asian economies. The principal recipients of the Nixon Doctrine appear to be the two major Communist powers — China in bolstering its position against USSR without sacrificing any resources, and the Soviet Union in multiplying its bilateral ties with non-Communist nations. However, their gains have tended so far to have a mutually neutralizing effect, and regional stability has therefore not yet been compromised. As noted earlier, however, the prospect of increased Sino-Soviet competition could adversely affect this situation.

Within this neutralizing but increasingly loose international environments the United States had to reshape her role in stabilizing the region. Of mounting importance, on the other hand, were (1) the orientation of Japan's policies, especially how its economic power should be translated into more constructive contribution toward regional stability, and (2) the durability of the Sino-Soviet schism.

Under the Nixon Doctrine, the United States endorsed China as a major power, and helped to increase Peking's influence in the world without adding greatly to China's military and industrial capabilities. Specifically, US policy added to the defensive potential of China to withstand Soviet pressures, and helped to confirm China's detente diplomacy as an effective instrument in Peking's foreign policy.

The Soviet Union might have been constrained slightly by the Nixon policies in its freedom of action toward China, but it has gained flexibility, access and influence on the levels of the lesser powers. The achievement by USSR of strategic parity with US has not so far significantly changed the basic power relationships in the Asian and Pacific region. Nor is there evidence that these major power relations will change substantially in the remained 70's or in early 80's unless Japan opts for nuclearization, which as noted earlier is unlikely in a visible future although it has not ratified

the NPT yet. Perhaps the major unknown affecting both Japan's options and systemic stability is the depth of Soviet commitment to the preservation of the new arrangements.

For Tokyo, a major impact of the Nixon Doctrine was the loosening of the US-Japan security system, consequently causing the discredibility of American partnership, in a way which, if the alliance were weakened appreciably, could result in Japan eventually becoming a major independent actor in the 1980's in both the economic and the political dimensions. The Nixon Doctrine also loosened the other postwar friendly relationships in the region. Hence, a major test for the United States in the mid-1970's as a result of the Nixon Doctrine was the strengthening of partnerships with allies while negotiating with former adversaries whose relative power capabilities increased substantially. The overriding operational aim of the United States policy, therefore, has to be to evolve a strengthened partnership between the United States and Japan, in which Tokyo's security remains assured. President Ford's visit to Tokyo and Prime Minister Miki's latest return visit to Washington were so arranged to recover the old firm friendly relationship between two countries which had been driven into a very critical state by the Nixinger (Nixon-Kissinger) »shock« diplomacy. Such partnership is indispensable as an interim stabilizing measure in the coming decade, or for a longer period, and as a basis for the emergence of a stable power distribution of world forces in the 1980's when the capabilities of China and Japan as major powers will have grown appreciably.

## VII. Prospects of Asian Security and Japan's Role

If security is defined as the state of no war or no conflict, the best option to be taken for that purpose is probably the maintenance of status quo, in other words, stability which means no change in this region. And, it seems to me that almost all the Asian people want stability at present because other alternatives are likely to cause rather worse. Even China seems to want stability. Smaller states, including two Koreas, where some serious situation has been reported, and North Vietnam, which wants to sit up the present system with Laos, Cambodia and others and build a stable system under its own guidance, do not want any change in this region which would affect its stability.

There have been various proposals made for Asian security since in late 1950's. Both of USSR and China proposed same kind of plans for nuclear-free zone in East Asia and Pacific area, by Khrushchev January 1959, at the 21st Party general assembly, and by Chou, April in the same year, at the 2nd national meeting of people's representatives respectively. Brezhnev proposed the Asian Collective

Security system at the World Communist Party, June 1969, and this proposal has been occasionally repeated and endorsed by other responsible leaders like Kossygin and Gromyko on other occasions. This seems to propose a regional version of the universal collective security system of the United Nations. However, it is still vague and has invited various suspicions as to whether it is the Soviet true desire, or merely propaganda, or a trial balloon, though Russian proposal seems to suggest a long-term politico-economic-military stabilization system in the Asian-Pacific region.

The Chinese assertion of No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, which was officially stated by the Chinese representative in his first speech at the United Nations General Assembly, November 1971, and had been the Chinese manifested attitude, is likely to be acceptable to every nuclear nation. The US-USSR accord on the Prevention of Nuclear War gives us some optimistic feeling in this regard. However, no-first-use means conversely, cynically speaking, an expression of nuclear counter-attack against an enemy's nuclear attack. Thus, various complicated problems would remain even were this principle adopted. So, this assertion is not a simple solution. In my view, this proposal should be considered in combination with other non-nuclearization measures like the Latin American nuclear-free zone declaration. If there could be such epoch-making tri-polar declaration of no-first-use of nuclear weapons by three nuclear powers in Asia, namely the United States, the Soviet Union and China, the Asian security, I believe, would be greatly promoted and it should be the vital part of a future new international security system in this region in parallel with other non-nuclear zone measures as proposed by Sri Lanka and other nine nations at the 26th UN general assembly, November 1971, for Indian Ocean nuclear-free zone, and as proposed by Pakistan for the 29th UN general assembly, September 1974, for South Asian nuclear-free zone.

Besides those nuclear power related proposals, some new thoughts of promoting and strengthening the Asian security system have been proposed by some responsible persons chronologically as follows: a Malaysian proposal for neutralized ASEAN at its foreign ministers meeting, November 1971; the Asian Forum concept proposed and adopted at the ministerial meeting of ASEAN, February 1973, which is still on its agenda for discussion; Japan-Indonesia-Australian linked cooperation system proposed respectively by the Australian and Indonesian top leaders (Whitlam and Suharto) in 1973, which was officially supported by the New Zealand leader, too, in late 1973; Korean foreign minister Kim's proposal to replace the ASPAC with a wider cooperative system including North Korea and China, June 1973; Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore proposal for a joint maritime security force consisting of Japan, Australia, Indonesia, US and other related countries to safeguard the free sea lanes in Indian and Pacific Oceans, May 1973. A Pan-Pacific Free Nations

cooperation system was also discussed broadly in 1973-74 period. Unfortunately, however, none of the above proposals has been accepted by the Asian people. Why?

»Asia« is a geographical concept — not cultural, not economic, nor political. Asian problems are diversified, regionally and qualitatively. Special characteristics of Asia are obstacles to forming some universal system in the region. There are many ex-colonial states, remaining as remnants of ex-suzerain state. The average national standard of living in Asia is generally quite low. Population and growth rates are high. Though Asian countries are located in an agrarian climate zone, they lack of food due to insufficient modernization of agriculture and rapid population growth. Asian nations have a high economic and military dependency on foreign aid. (The foreign aid receipts and GNP figures of Asian nations are directly proportional.) Both the continental and maritime nations exist in Asia, and Asian nations as a whole are sensitive to the political moves of the great powers. Asia has been the stage for Communist expansion and the international rivalry resulting there-from. Asia is not a integrated region like Europe consisting of independent, advanced or relatively advanced nations. Asia lacks the closeness which makes the formation of a region of neighbors easy. A universal and comprehensive system may find it difficult to be built in, probably impossible, unless some common compromise be reached among Asian nations with such diversified self-interests.

Though the Asian security or stability may fluctuate within the three major frameworks, as stated earlier, of US-USSR-China, US-Japan-West Europe, and US-USSR-China-Japan international relationships, they cannot satisfy the individual Asian nation's self-interest, and consequently though they are surely some important keys to analyze the Asian situations, they are not the solutions to the Asian problems. The situation in Asia rather different. It is more fluid, more uncertain and complex. The future of Asia remains ambiguous, and it will still take time — and probably more blood. The situation is essentially in flux, and its eventual outcome simply cannot be predicted. The area is dominated by strong nationalistic passions and by intense efforts on the part of the states concerned to build up their military forces. This militarization of the region tends to conflict with effective economic development, with its concomitant domestic political spin-off, thereby sharpening underlying social tensions, and posing more generally the specter of social fragmentation in some of the Asian countries.

In such a fluid situation in Asia, the Japanese have yet to find their own sense of political direction and they lack a larger framework for a positive political expression of their yearning for a larger role in international political arena. The Japanese awareness of the nations political and economic vulnerability in the oil crisis did not have even a slight effect toward a realization of military vul-

nerability. A decision to rearm with strategic weapons, which has been so often feared overseas, requires bold domestic leadership. Boldness will hardly be forthcoming from the series of weak coalitions under dwindling Liberal Democratic Party majorities. In short, although Japan will assume a more active diplomacy in Asia and elsewhere, Japan's strategic security needs will not be readily perceived in Tokyo as requiring drastic revision in defense capabilities.

In addition, the Japanese constants of insularity, the absence of abundant natural resources and reliance on the American security commitment serve to restrain dramatic new foreign policy initiatives abroad. Further, the definition of Japan's international role is made all the more difficult by the similarly ambiguous attitude towards Japan on the part of other Asian nations. They do desire Japanese economic engagement in their own development, on the one hand, yet they fear Japanese political predominance and resent Japanese physical presence, on the other. This inhibits Japan from finding a constructive role for itself in Asian development and stability, even though Japanese economic aid has already become a critical factor in the development of several Asian countries.

Atlantic-Pacific interaction in political security may serve to enhance the sense of the common stake of the Atlantic-Pacific worlds in Asian stability, and may satisfy Japanese sentiments who have grown up too powerful economically, too advanced in its social development, and potentially too powerful to be fitted into a purely regional Asian role. But, how much does it give relief to the other Asian people? Probably nothing! We need more microscopic approach to the Asian problems — more psychological deep into the people living there — rather than macroscopic interaction relationship on the globe. For that, some long-range devices of personal relation at various levels,\* are to be brought in Asian and Pacific region on the multiplied and bilateral basis. Time and patience are most required for the Asian security, which is still far away to go in a true sense.

\* combined with more attractive and constructive measures including several arms control efforts.