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GLOBAL SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

“When the quest for mastery control and certainty is accompanied by a quest for ‘minding the unknown’ and for ‘thinking forth the latent and potential’, the hubris of mastery is irredeemably tempered.”

Barbara Adam

Abstract: Unanticipated changes, events and crises challenge the explanatory and predictive capacity of the social sciences and their position in society. This challenge concerns the availability of relevant knowledge, but also the translation and adoption of the knowledge for governance in the context of the global power structure and (hidden) dominance of profit-based interests. This paper briefly sketches some of the (latent) dimensions of the interrelationships between social research and the steering of social change with a particular focus on the mass migration/refugee ‘crisis’.

The paper considers this crisis as a surprise and presents some other failures to predict the case of Yugoslavia and refugees in Europe 2015. Migration research is critically evaluated and the ‘rocky road’ of its theoretical embedding is highlighted. Regularity and predictability are assessed from the point of view of the conflictive dynamic of the integration of diversity and unity of opposites of empowerment and domination. The consequences of migration as expressed in the rise of authoritarian populism are outlined.

Key words: *globalisation, social sciences, international migration, refugees, regularity, predictability, heterogenisation, homogenisation, empowerment, hegemonisation, authoritarian populism, minorities, social research, Europe, Yugoslavia*

INTRODUCTION

This paper starts by noting that today there are indications that the processes of (global) social transformation are in many ways running ahead of the epistemological advances in the social sciences. This contradicts the assumptions and aspirations that the social sciences are taking on the leading role of science in

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steering social change. Yet the failure of the largest ‘experiment’ in human history in the name of ‘scientific socialism’ and many other unanticipated/unpredicted outcomes of purposeful collective interventions do not justify the simple discounting of future efforts to better contribute to understanding, predicting and impacting societal change and emancipatory endeavours around the world. Instead, it should represent an additional incentive for critical self-reflexivity to disclose in which areas the social sciences are lagging behind, and why?¹ Anthony Giddens already drew attention to the changing notion of globalisation from something ‘Out there’... to [...] the very texture of everyday life’ (Giddens, 1999). This could be understood as domestication of the world in the context of time-space compression. But underestimations of the relevance of general cognisance and of (un-)resolved conceptual and theoretical issues for current social practice prevent such an approach and any greater role for the social sciences in global governance.

A common understanding of globalisation includes the broadening and intensification of interconnectedness and interdependence in the world. This requires social theory to develop an inclusive, holistic approach at a time when the social sciences are highly divided and fragmented. This explains why I primarily rely on nomothetic sociology, which provides the most inclusive and integrative approach to the spatial, temporal, sectoral (disciplinary) and hierarchical dimensions of social life, increasingly by also considering changes in the natural environment. A specific event will be interpreted in the broadest social and cognitive context by leaning on some of my previous concepts, models and theoretical interpretations of (developmental) change in a long-term perspective.

The mass immigration/refugee ‘crisis’ affecting Europe in 2015 may be considered a ‘surprise’ and challenge for re-assessing the issues of regularity and predictability of social changes within and beyond the nation state, chiefly from the point of view of the dialectics of the unity of the opposites of homogenisation-heterogenisation and hegemonisation-empowerment. International and transnational migration as a component of global flows, particularly between the South and North Atlantic, requires both a broadening of the horizons of the relevance of diversity and greater attention to inequality and the emancipatory social movements in theory and practice. Some implications for scientific policy and the role of academies of science will be discussed.

SURPRISES AND CHALLENGES OF UNPREDICTED CHANGES

If we assume the social sciences hold a predictive capacity, in principle we would not be forced to cope with surprising social changes/events as we have seen in the last few decades on the national and global level. The social sciences have generally not attempted to deal with surprise as a category of event. According to Charles

¹ This paper is partly based on my presentation — “Have social sciences failed? On regularity and predictability of social changes: The case of refugee/migration crises”, presented at the annual meeting of the Slovenian Sociological Society, Otočec, 28–30 Sept. 2017, Section for Sociology of Science.

S. Maier, “historians and social scientists alike find their true vocation not in rendering surprise inevitable, but plausible in retrospect. Surprise, in effect, challenges us to construct a story that renders it unsurprising”. He continues: “surprise is a counterfactual made factual and in effect confirms the realm of counterfactual. It is the task of the historian and the social scientist alike to render surprise non-surprising in retrospect. The social scientist can dream of a world in which surprise is eliminated because all is foreseen” (Maier, 2009).

Malpas and Wickham are very critical of the state of the art: “[W]e may be said to be cautiously directing sociology’s attention to the proposition that much twentieth-century western life, including the conduct of sociology, is characterised by a *refusal to recognise the centrality of failure* [italics by ZM] and the inevitability of incompleteness. Thus, failure is seen as the exception rather than the rule, and as something to be eventually overcome through improvements in the knowledge or technique...”. This critique shows that a strong challenge awaits us in finding the basis for this explanation.

In fact, e. g. political scientists and sociologists did not predict the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the war in former Yugoslavia, the Arab Spring in North Africa, Brexit etc. The global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 was generally considered a big failure of economics. This triggered strong criticism of (mainstream) economics, of the rigidity of its narrow academic field and its limitation of rational behaviour within the existing system.²

Despite the extensive research into international migration in many social sciences — sociology, geography, social anthropology, economics, among others — it was for many people a great surprise when a wave of immigrants and refugees started entering Europe in 2015. This was characterised as a “mass migration/refugee crisis” and ultimately demanded a clarification of the predictive role and social mission of social research.

Already a quick review reveals that considerable literature exists on both voluntary and forced international migration, on migrants and refugees. Still in Europe, Africa and elsewhere, as some UN activists have critically noted, the research was predominantly descriptive in character.

In order to respond to the challenges facing Europe since 2015, I will focus on forced international migration, primarily in the long-term sociological perspective, which is in line with my concept of spatial sociology I introduced at the

² Johannes Petry argues that the academic discipline of economics has failed because it has become incredibly rigid, focusing only on a few core axioms and discarding alternative perspectives. And the outcome of this is the inability of the mainstream to properly understand the global financial or sovereign debt crises and integrate them into existing models as the discipline is blinded and trapped by its concentration on the core axioms (Petry, 2016). However, economics also includes Human Centred Economics, PARECON — Participatory Economics as a model for a new economy based on democracy, justice and ecological sustainability, Behavioural economics which incorporates psychological assumptions and allows for irrational behaviour (Noble laureate 2017 — Richard Thaler), environmental economics etc.




Fig. 1. Refugees and displaced persons from former Yugoslavia since 1991 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_migrant_crisis)

University of Ljubljana in 1989 (Mlinar, 2004). I shall rely on my previous studies and generalisations concerning the dialectics of cross-level socio-spatial transformation on the continuum from local communities at one end to global society at the other.

Considering my own context and my participant observation in Slovenia/Yugoslavia together with the location of this conference in Podgorica, Montenegro, I start by recalling ethno-national conflicts in Yugoslavia in the 1990 s. As seen in the graph below, close to 4 million people

were displaced or became refugees in former Yugoslavia. Paradoxically, having been some kind of showcase of friendly coexistence with the greatest ethno-religious heterogeneity in the area, Bosnia then became the area of the worst violence and forced migration³.

The interethnic tensions and war took place within the state and yet in themselves did not assume global dimensions. However, several experiences from then have wider relevance. This was occurring in a transition from an authoritarian order 'from above' (suppressing the expression of opposing interests) to the anticipated democratic order 'from below', which unexpectedly also provided space for populist manipulation in the name of ethnic identities. Some critical social scientists publicly striving for democratisation called for pluralist politics (beyond a one-party

³ In the National Tolerance study in former Yugoslavia, Hodson, Sekulić and Massey found higher levels of tolerance in more heterogeneous settings. Paradoxically, Bosnia enjoyed the highest level of tolerance of any Yugoslav republic yet it experienced the most brutal and prolonged armed conflict. "Elites may find such situations conducive to mobilizing efforts in pursuit of ends that come to be defined in national terms ... These mobilized national groups may pursue these ends through armed conflicts, attacking even those against whom they initially bear only limited animosities. Conversely, homogeneity appears to lead to greater intolerance but a lower likelihood of open conflict" (Hodson, Sekulić, Massey 1994). The authors leave open how a violent, armed conflict arises between parties that are tolerant of each other.




Fig. 2. European Migrant Crisis 2015. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_migrant_crisis)

system) with the institutionalisation of opposing interests. But they did not anticipate this would lead to turmoil, war and collapse of the Yugoslav federation (see Toš, ed. 1983). Sociologists and political scientists may easily recognise the relevance of this experience for the seemingly very different cases of unanticipated consequences of interventions in the name of democracy in Iraq, Libya and elsewhere in the world. Moreover, the refugee issue always accompanies such changes, at least behind the institutional curtain

The process of dismembering Yugoslavia involved both the emancipatory tendencies of weaker ethno-national units and populist manipulations, with the latter requiring ethnic homogenisation and on the basis of contiguity produced violence and forced migration and justified ethnic cleansing (Mlinar, 1995; Gasparini, ed., 1995).

The graphic presentation of the “European Migrant crisis” (left) provides a broader context of the experience — beyond national borders and the European continent — by presenting the wave of mass immigration into Europe 2015. Without examining the details, this shows the number of refugees by country of origin,

the migration routes and the distribution by countries of destination. The origin highlights the war in Syria; among the destination countries Germany stands out strongly with its relative openness and high capacity to accept migrants and refugees. While the war in Syria is expected to end, more distant areas in the East and South, even in Sub-Saharan Africa, may continue to be a source of both forced and voluntary migration. Forced not only by violence but also by changes in the environment, a topic lying beyond of the scope of the discussion here.

The broader spatial and temporal perspective blurs the extremes of particular events. Yet at the same time it provides a framework for disclosing the processes and regularities which, especially from a sociological perspective, can serve to prevent dramatisation of an event (like ‘the End of the EU’) and for more realistic predictions of the global future. In 30 years’ time, we see (the graph below) a clear trend of ‘growth in global human migration’ (1970–2000) in terms of absolute numbers; if measured as a proportion of the increasing world population, there is no such increase. In general, within a shorter time period we find certain particularities of each moment are more visible. Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas (2014) studied the globalisation of migration and analysed changes in the spread, distance and intensity of migration. Their key observation here is that migration has “globalised” from a destination-country perspective but hardly from an origin-country perspective. This raises the questions of the global embedding of this subject, and of regularity and predictability, which are to be discussed below.

Empirical evidence of the (long-term) rise in the number of international migrants must be examined by locating it within the theoretical context of global social transformation.




Fig. 3. Growth in global human migration, 1970–2000
(National Research Council, 2010. *Understanding the Changing Planet: Strategic Directions for the Geographical Sciences*)

Less and less of what is happening in a particular nation state and in Europe can be explained without knowing the conditions and changes occurring elsewhere, on other continents. Here is the topic already elaborated by Michael D. Kennedy in his book *Globalizing Knowledge: Intellectuals, Universities, and Publics in Transformation* (2014). By extending the territorial framework, we capture greater diversity and greater inequality; both of which make up the core of the dynamics of mobility. The history of Northern (imperial and neoliberal) dominance accompanied by unidirectional thinking and the persistence of a diffusionist model of the flow of knowledge contributes considerably to understanding the failure of the unanticipated 'crisis' in the EU. Critical and deconstructive endeavours against North-Atlantic domination (as traced by Wiebke 2011, 2014) indicate the road to circulation and the need to correct the ignorant or biased picture of the South.

And how have sociologists in Europe responded to 'Europe 2015'? One illustrative fragment of the wider response is the European Sociological Association Conference held in Athens, 2017 with 850 discussions.

SOCIAL RESEARCH AND THE THEORETICAL EMBEDDING OF THE SUBJECT

“MUCH OF WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW IS WRONG”

In order to clarify the role of social research and particularly migration research in 'Europe 2015', we must start by assessing the state of the art. Hein de Haas, one of the leading researchers into this theme in Europe offers a very critical evaluation of the migration research so far and, based on extensive international migration research, de Haas concludes: “Much of what we think we know is wrong. The debate over migration is plagued by a variety of inaccuracies and misunderstandings” (<http://heindehaas.blogspot.si/>).

Thus, he is critical of the overall lack of conceptual, analytical and empirical rigour in both scholarly research and debates on international migration as well as state policies. “Most existing evidence is descriptive, biased and partial, which is related to the weak embedding of migration policies research into general theories on the causes of migration” (de Haas, 2011, p. 6). He especially highlights the lack of theoretically-driven research on the nature and causes of migration.

By answering why research on this issue has hardly moved forward over the last decades, he points to the problem of the weak connection with fundamental theoretical research on the nature and causes of migration processes. This also implies the social and theoretical context needs to expand so as to include global social transformation.

In the research on migration as well as in social theory generally, examples abound of the *mechanistic understanding* of social change that is increasingly departing from recognition of a fluid society on the global scale. *Forces, factors, causes, determinants, variables* etc. assume an understanding of social life that better suits the past than present or future. Papastergiadis (2000, p. 35) claims: “We would need to think more about the processes of flux and flow, rather than fixing

solely on the causes or consequences of single trajectories. From this perspective, migration would be seen as a multi-vectorial phenomenon. Change would be understood more broadly as being *generated by the very process of interaction*, rather than the imposition of external forces on predefined subjects". In this sense, within a non-mechanistic perspective, he interprets the identity of migrants as "not subordinate to external categories, but formed out of their own experience of movement and settlement" (ibid.).⁴

Responses to the extending and intensifying of interconnectedness and interdependence within the context of 'time-space compression' are typically lagging behind when we consider:

- people's awareness in general;
- the policies of nation-states; and
- cognitive responses in the social sciences.

The inertia stemming from the traditional understanding of the importance of physical distance and of the territorial order leads to underestimating the (potential) impact of distant events/changes. Such an understanding has most dramatically been revealed in the very responses to the immigration/refugee 'crises'⁵ in Europe. Compared to this, the North-South imperial and corporate expansionism were not so challenging; instead, it was an ingredient of unidirectional thinking and hegemonic tendencies of the North. Epistemologically, such thinking within the social sciences preceded the systemic understanding of feedback and the general model in communication research entailing an evolution in communication patterns — from one to one, one to many, and many with many.

The fact that social research is epistemologically lagging behind in cognitive understanding when looking at the broader framework is amply demonstrated in several writings by Stephen Castles: He seeks to "link analysis of migratory processes to broader social theory and through this to the analysis of societal change in general. The development of migration theory at this historical juncture should therefore be linked to the analysis of social transformation processes at a range of socio-spatial levels: whether a specific piece of research starts with a local phenomenon or a global one, or somewhere in-between, it needs to be based on an awareness of connectivity between localities and mediations between levels" (Castles, 2008, p. 17).

However, the next question falls within social theory seen more broadly, concerning societal change. Once again, here we encounter many unrecognised or unresolved issues. When the concept of globalisation was rising rapidly and grabbing overall attention, the development concept quietly shifted position from being a central concept in the social sciences to ever more peripheral concerns or a speciality mainly involving developing countries. Globalisation first of all led to an increase in complexity and provided a breeding ground for complexity revival

⁴ And such an understanding of causality, can be found in the book — H. Teune, Z. Mlinar, *Developmental Logic of Social Systems*, 1978.

⁵ When considering an even as a component of anticipated variability of a process of 'long durée' it may lose the character of a crisis.

of dialectics which is now taking place. “Global studies” require systems thinking and can benefit by leaving behind the time when systems were seen as fixed, closed, and tending to equilibrium, to complex adaptive systems perceived as open, dynamic and potentially capable of both moving closer to equilibrium and moving away (Cudworth and Hobden, 2015, p. 57).

What about “the end of development”? Degrowth? Has globalisation replaced development as the leading concept? And another ‘tacit’ conceptual discontinuity is awaiting a response. The Marxist understanding of socialisation (of production) has been completely discarded in mainstream sociology and social theory. Thus, socialisation is today understood only as a process within the life cycle of an individual, not in the sense of long-term societal change (see dictionaries of sociology). Does this reflect the end of the process in social reality or the failure of social theory, which has unreflectively accepted such a conceptual discontinuity as a divide in the accumulation of knowledge?

If we understand production not as something trapped within factory walls and not in terms of the division between production, distribution, consumption, but as a ‘foundational process of life’ in the context of the time–space compression of today’s world then we have identified the commonality with the globalisation process.

Instead of *a priori* acting against globalisation (like some anti-globalisation movements), we need a more differentiated approach and ask ‘what kind of globalisation’. Sociologists in particular could offer themselves a more grounded and firm position on which to stand, restrained by the excessive variability of one-sided commitments in both theory and practice.

REGULARITY AND PREDICTABILITY

Thinking pertinent to today’s discussions on the regularity of social change and on global social transformation was already underway in the 1960 s and 1970 s and still continuing. One controversy referred to (neo)evolutionism (Nisbet 1969; Lenski, 1976; Becher 1979; AJS, Vol. 84). The main outcome was a shift away from determinism to probalism. Postmodern thinking brought the end of the ‘grand narratives’, the end of regularity, followed by strong criticism in several scientific disciplines.

Among the latest presentations of the social evolution process we find one written by Garry Jacobs, far from a simplistic linear understanding: “The ascent of humanity from small, isolated homogeneous communities to an interconnected and complex global society marks a long, slow, arduous and often violent process of social evolution replete with failed attempts, flawed experiments, backlashes and reversions to earlier forms, usurpations and perversions by entrenched powers that resist change or by disenfranchised groups impatient to seize power. Yet, taken as a whole, the progress of democracy presents a remarkable record of the incomplete march of humanity from barbarism to civilisation and culture based on universal human values” (Jacobs, 2017, p. 134).

This is a very realistic presentation, beyond the many one-sided interpretations of long-term social change. It has much in common with the following critical interpretation of development: "World history is not a smooth, linear development to any direction, however rational that direction may be. As processes are subjected to regression, entropy, and roll-back, we cannot expect real geo-historical processes to be anything but a messy affair. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude, that because developments are not smooth and linear, and because many developments seem regressive or chaotic, there is no rational tendential direction to world history" (Patomäki, 2015, p. 178).

Yet, with all this variability, is there any communality left? The maximum inclusiveness of diversity requires a response on the most general level. And just 40 years ago Henry Teune and Zdravko Mlinar published the book "Developmental Logic of Social Systems" (1978). It presented a theory that encompasses the societies of the South and the North, their past, their present and their future. Although formulated in systems language at a very general level, its relevance for dealing with issues arising in international migration may be seen in the following citations.

"Integration and diversity are in dynamic conflict which is zero sum at any point in time and positive sum in the longer run. This conflict drives the system to higher levels of development and to developmental change" (p. 74); "Thus the higher the level of diversity and variety, the shorter the period of time in which new variety will be created" (p. 76).




Fig. 4. The Dynamic of the Integration of Diversity
(Teune, Mlinar, 1978, 86)

Levels of greater organised variety can absorb more variety than levels with less... Any new item of variety in a large field of variety will be less 'disturbing', that is, it is unlikely to deviate substantially from what the component already has. The disorganisation introduced by any new item of variety is a function of the total amount of variety already possessed" (p. 78).

The above, in spite of the very general formulation, can be recognised in many empirical research studies e. g. on tolerance of diversity in nation states, on attitudes to immigrants, on xenophobia in Western European and 'post-communist countries' (Burjanek, 2001).

The authors distinguished three basic types of social system: 1. Coaction systems with similarities within the system and differences compared to other systems; 2. Interaction systems based on the principle of similarities and differences; and 3. Transaction systems, dominated by the principle of differences, rather than similarities. According to the authors, the debate over implicit development models had to some extent led to the abandonment of theory in favour of ideographic descriptions of particular developmental experience. They believed, however, that such diversity is rather a challenge for even broader theory.

A lot of translation work and a long text would be required to disclose the relevance of the very general interpretation of the integration of diversity for the specific issues of migration. Margaret Archer, past president of the ISA, found it in her presidential address "Sociology for one world: Unity and diversity, 1991".

FROM NATION STATE TO CROSS-LEVEL DYNAMICS

The already over-theorised focusing on the nation-state level does not enable the crucial cross-level dynamics of rapprochement and polarisation between the individual and global society to be examined in the long-term perspective. It is only when all levels are considered that it becomes possible to disclose the regularities of changes in cross-level relations which involve a redistribution of power. E. g. subnational actors are strengthening their direct links with supranational actors and thus empowering their position vis-à-vis national government.

A graphic illustration gives some examples of such tendencies of bypassing government on the national level. In Slovenia, prior to the country's 'independence', a strong feeling was expressed: "The voice of Slovenia has hardly been listened to" (*glas Slovenije je le težko prodiral v svet*). As a state, it has direct links with Brussels.

Ideally, as promoted by UNESCO ("roots and wings") and expressed by Jacques Delors (1996, p. 17): "...people need gradually to become world citizens without losing their roots and while continuing to play an active part in the life of their national and local community". This is a normative statement with the implicit assumption of win-win relations. In reality: the most attached locally tend to be the least involved globally.

In Europe, in both theory and practice/politics restrictive approaches to particular levels or pairs of levels, like the nation-state–EU level, without being aware that at the same time this implies a more static approach and prevents long-term processes being considered. And there are recognisable successive periods in which




Fig. 5. Tendencies of Subnational Actors: Bypassing Directly Superior
(Z. Mlinar)

there was a preoccupation with particular segments such as only with local–national, national–supranational (EU) etc.

In the long-term perspective, we are revealing the tendencies toward both the polarisation and convergence of the extremes of the individual and of the global. The war and suffering of displaced individuals and families in several countries basically lies in the hands of super powers within and outside the UN; and is in service of multinationals’ interests, typically in oil fields. Having a view of the long term provides the basis for a more restrained response to the high variability.

The protection of individual human rights is growing in priority over the sovereignty of nation states. Albeit with difficulties and inconsistently, individuals have for several decades already been gradually asserting themselves as subjects of international law (Tomuschat, 1984).

For the first time in history, the individual is able to exercise his/her rights at the supranational level, for example before the European Court. National sovereignty, expressed via a state’s right to non-interference in its internal affairs, is becoming less important than the protection of universal human rights and minorities.

Human rights have been increasingly decoupled from citizenship. However, Dieter Gosewinkel argues that talk of a transition from citizenship tied to the nation state to “post-national membership” is ... exaggerated. The fact is that human rights have not displaced, let alone replaced, citizenship as the basis for protecting individual rights, in either Eastern or Western Europe (Gosewinkel, 2017, p. 9)

We can extend the above by considering some additional ideas of Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim: “It is sometimes claimed that individualisation means autonomy, emancipation, the freedom and self-liberation, of humanity. But




Fig. 6. Global Society
(Z. Mlinar)

sometimes anomie rather than autonomy seems to prevail — a state unregulated to the point of lawlessness... Any generalisation that seeks to understand individualised society only in terms of one extreme or the other autonomy or anomie — abbreviates and distorts the questions that confront us here. This society is characterised by hybrid forms, contradictions, ambivalences (dependent on political, economic and family conditions" (Beck and Beck Gernsheim, 2001).

Thus, the discussion of regularity involving the issues of predictability has already for quite some time been one of the most contested topics in the social sciences (Symposium on Prediction in the Social Sciences 1995). It is understood that sociology's ability to make valid predictions is a sign of the discipline's maturity, while also remaining sceptical of the field's capacity to generate predictive knowledge. This poses the challenge of reviewing and identifying a large number of conceptual and theoretical achievements and disputes from the points of view of dialectics, system theory/thinking, complexity/chaos theory, sociology of the future and others, yet this lies beyond the scope of this paper! They tend to be more critical than earlier theorising about the prospects for the future both because of the social issues and the environmental crisis. Yet at the same time we observe many new warning and early response systems, increasing computer capacity to help calculate and predict and also more responsive research. This suggests that events like 'Europe 2015' may be more predictable and less of a surprise.

Barbara Adam introduced "New Sociology of the Future" in the broader context of sociology of time, and cognitive frameworks for our topic. A book with a predictive character is I. Wallerstein, R. Collins, M. Mann, G. Derluguian, C. Calhoun: 'Does Capitalism have a Future?'

Momir Đurović in his book "The Future has no History" in extending the topic to include the questions of our survival and particularity how to understand the sudden and unexpected uncertainties.

SPATIAL MOBILITY AND HETEROGENISATION

By distinguishing the different territorial reach of flows of people, objects (material goods) and information, we shed light on the important conditioning of changes on both sides in the countries of origin and the destination countries. Here I can merely state: 1. The advantage of the reach of the flow of information and of communication between countries at different development levels may raise aspirations for additional emigration. 2.




Fig. 7. Different Territorial Reach of Movements, Flows (Mlinar, 1999, p. 137)

Intensive connectedness through communications will prolong the ethnic identity of emigrants, but (due to individual communication) not necessarily their ethnic clustering.

The endeavour to embed the migration research in cognitive frameworks of a higher order can be served by one of the models I have constructed according to Teune/Mlinar's theory of developmental change but where I distinguish three main types of systems: coaction, interaction and transaction systems and my early writings on globalisation. It is a variant of the interpretation of the opposites of individualisation (increasing diversity) and globalisation (also assuming many similarities in the world context).




Fig. 8. Long-Term View of Spatial Mobility (Ideal-type illustration) (Mlinar, 1994, p. 105)

Thus, I present the changes beyond separate 'societies', bounded entities or sedentary containers of geographical propinquity




Fig. 9. Mixing of the Population in Nation States as a perceived threat (Z. Mlinar)

(see also Urry, 2000, 2007). Refugees and forced migration tend more toward ethnic clustering, and migrants more toward individuality and dispersion in space.

With increasing openness and mobility, it becomes more and more difficult to distinguish the indigenous population of a particular country from its immigrants. With the erosion of borders between countries both because of individualization's tendency toward spatial dispersion and institutional changes, the share of autochthonous people will decline (as occurred in past decades in the former Yugoslav republics). The identification of those who are autochthonous will be made ever harder as it becomes more and more common for individuals to spend only part of their life in a certain place or country (Mlinar, 2012, p. 251).

A psychologically important point is when the increasing share of immigrants in a country's population reaches 50%. This is a critical point which indicates that autochthonous nationals may become a minority in their 'own land' and this is often well instrumentalised by populist politicians, pointing to the threat posed by foreigners.

HELPING OR DISCRIMINATING ETHNIC MINORITIES, 1950–2003

In Slovenia, the Italian and Hungarian ethnic minorities as autochthonous groups have special constitutional rights, yet this is not the case of immigrants from the former Yugoslav republics. Their feelings of discrimination are also expressed in public protests.

However, the latest World Development Report (2017) data support




Fig. 10. Helping or Discriminating Ethnic Minorities 1950–2003 (Adapted from WDR, 2017)

my general interpretation of the empowerment of subnational actors/minorities over the long period of 60 years. This also empirically provides an indicator that speaks against the “end of regularity” thesis.

AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM AND ‘PROVINCIAL UNIVERSALISM’

One of the most pressing topics facing Europe and the USA today is the rise of right-wing populism. This largely represents a political response to mass immigration and the view that refugees are a threat to national identity. Populism involves a political manipulation that relies on a well-known mechanism: external threat — internal unification. Sociologically, this means homogenisation, often as a hidden form of regression. Instead of a unity of diversity, here we encounter unity in its reduced form; unity on the basis of similarity.

In Zaheer Baber’s article “Provincial Universalisms: The Landscape of Knowledge Production in an Era of Globalization” (2003), we find both a critique of European provincialism with its pretension of representing universal science and a critique of the implicit or explicit hegemonic viewpoint that accompanies metropolitan imperial politics. Baber (2003, p. 617) states: “A few notable exceptions notwithstanding, knowledge produced by scholars located in metropolitan societies was deemed to be general and universal in their implication regardless of how local or provincial their terms of reference might be. At the same time, social scientific knowledge produced in locations considered ‘peripheral’ in the




Fig. 11. The Rise of Authoritarian populism in Europe: A Response to the External Threat? (Adapted from TIMBRO authoritarian Populism Index 2017)

overall intellectual landscape is generally regarded as a specific case study with little if any general implications". He concludes that "...the dominant pattern of knowledge production continues to reflect a *very stratified, hierarchical division* of intellectual labour that does not adequately convey the realities of globalisation" (p. 621).

Such a division of intellectual labour does not convey the realities of the countries that are the sources of immigrants/refugees arriving in Europe. And looking 'from above' does not encompass an emancipatory approach to expose their living conditions in European countries.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

Paradoxically, instead of social science tracing the paths of social change to the future, the examined state of the art indicates that, in many regards, they are lagging somewhat behind the actual social transformation. This has been demonstrated in many unanticipated events and particularly the 'migration/refugee crisis' in Europe of 2015. The unpredicted wave of migrants/refugees from Asia and Africa revealed eurocentrism as too narrow a cognitive framework for understanding the transnational flows. Underestimation of the relevance of what is distant in the physical and cognitive space requires a critical response. The questions of regularity and predictability were presented in the cognitive framework of sociology as the most inclusive integrative and nomothetic social science discipline. Long-term regularity was presented as a conflictive dynamic of diversity and the integration and of hegemonisation and empowerment. The question of predictability (the issue of diversity and inequality) is a highly contested issue which cannot be answered with a simple yes or no; 'early warning systems', computer capacity and — last but not the least — the human agency expressed in the role of the social sciences prove a meaningful effort is being made to cope with it. Instead of a priori discarding what is distant in physical and cognitive space, here a call is made to broaden the understanding of relevance within a more inclusive science and society. Academies of science can help build bridges between the most general and the most specific.

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