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***Observing and predicting traditionalism on the basis of
confessional belonging in the (former) Yugoslavia,
1986 and 2009****

Abstract

Differences in traditionalism value constructs are studied in the (former) Yugoslavia, 1986 and 2009. In the mean time both socialism and the Yugoslav state disappeared, followed by wars. In view of Huntington's (1994), Meštrović et al.'s (1993) and Tomka's (2006) assertions, traditionalism would peak among Muslims and be followed among the Orthodox, owing to the immanent properties of these religions. Significant differences in the means for these constructs are found among members of the observed confessions. In the first time instance, the Orthodox are somewhat more inclined toward the traditionalist stands in comparison to Catholics and Muslims, whereas in 2009 the Muslims clearly peak. Differences between the Orthodox and the Catholics in 2009 are not significant. In a regression model, at the second time instance, confessional belonging, does not predict the magnitude of traditionalism, except for Muslims. Authoritarianism proves the strongest predictor of traditionalism. The wars following Yugoslav dissolution, affecting Muslims most gravely suffice to explain the findings by the Durkheimian paradox, on the one hand, and by differences in the level of modernization on the other, although the invoking cultural essentialist explanation is not explicitly rejected.

* The paper is printed as submitted.

Introduction

Traditionalism vs. its overcoming at a value level is close to the centre to the sociological study of society, particularly of modernization. Durkheim wrote of it already in his first book, when noting the 'emancipation from customs', clearly associating it with the modernization process (1893/2000, 57). Speaking of pre-modern societies, Parsons mentions 'cultural traditions...being close ...to solidarities of particular groups' (1964/2000, 88). Lerner, the classical proponent of personality modernization as relevant for societal modernization, underscores in this respect 'leaving the constrictive traditional universe and nuding the psyche toward the expansive new land of heart's desire' (1958/2000, 132), i. e. striving toward achieving one's objective irrespective of tradition.

Traditionality and traditionalism, as a positive evaluation of the past, are also known to be substantially positively associated with religiosity (Shils, 1981; Flere & Lavriè, 2007). Religiosity is not completely, but mostly provenient from the past and substantially associated with it.

But both religiosity and traditionalism have socially integrative roles, although this cannot be universalized. It was Durkheim who specified this issue, limiting the role of traditional values primarily to underdeveloped society (1893/2000). Beside traditionalism, even authoritarianism, although it may have psychologically undesirable characteristics (Adorno et al., 1950), may also have socially and societally integrative functions, being a 'mechanism of seeking support and shelter', having to do with 'cohesion of group' (Oesterreich, 2005, 281) or to deal with the 'desire for social cohesion motivated by a concern for the social order' (Feldman 2003, 69). Thus, in dealing with all values and stands considered, not merely with antiquated values, but also with societally integrative values.

Turning toward the cultural setting we are studying, it is well known that within democratic and capitalist transformation Yugoslavia along with its dissolution and war, in fact a number of them. The literature on this issue is opulent, but little has been done to overcome numerous controversies on causes of dissolution and war and on those guilty for the particularly ugly nature of conflicts (Ramet 2004; Jovic 2001; Wachtel & Bennett 2009). The conflictual and ugly nature of the dissolution may be considered in contrast to the previous Yugoslav state, known for multi-ethnic tolerance and a relatively

liberal type of socialism, if not exactly liberal, certainly open to Western influences (Wachtel & Bennett 2009).

In the recent volume *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies*, it pursues from the findings of Marie Janine Calic that it was Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina who were affected the harshest in the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. According to one account noted, 71% of the dead in the Bosnian war (1992-1995) were Bosniaks (2009 138). The only instance of genocide recognized in the war was against the Muslim Bosniaks (2009 129). Of course, Bosniaks were not the only Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, the other main area inhabited by Muslims was Kosovo. According to James Gow, in the same volume the number of refugees in the mainly Muslim Albanian Kosovo area was at one moment in 1999 between 660 000 and 700 000 (2009 316) (out of a total of approximately 2 million inhabitants). This is not belittle other atrocities, but is evident that Muslims, particularly Bosnian once were most victimized (although they may not peak in the total number of later refugees). Such an extent of conflict and victimization was not observed in other war areas, when large areas are observed.

The former Yugoslavia presents a very interesting research situation for longitudinal study, with both socialism and a single state disappearing, new states and a new social system replacing them. In this paper we attempted to shed some light on whether structural and situational (war and peace) variables suffice in explaining the differences in religiosity and in traditionalism – modernism, or whether cultural essentialist factors need to be invoked, in keeping with Huntington (1996). In his *Clash of Civilizations* (1996), searching for the sources of civilizational identities and their contemporary incompatibilities, Huntington speaks of ‘individualism’ as the axiological specificity of Western civilization (1996, 71). It was the ‘revolution of Romeo and Juliet’ which was launched many centuries ago. Individualism in this meaning is also responsible for the pluralist, competitive and democratic political system. This is in stark contrast to other civilizations, particularly to the Islamic one where ‘the Koran and the Sharia constitute basic law’ (1996, 72), which are immutable and unadjustable to circumstances. Huntington goes on to contend that in Islam, modernization can take place, but only at the technical level, whereas the values set in the teachings are to be taken literally and interpreted without adjustment.

It is not taking too much liberty to interpret that Huntington was saying Western civilization was the first to have renounced traditionally established patterns of behaviour, the very establishment of value patterns by traditional succession, and the very valuation of the past in favour of current and even fashion-launched individual patterns of pursuits and choices, that it is to have renounced traditionalism as a value basis for conducting one's life which is rejected by the West, as its axiological basis.

Further, there may be significant differences as to traditional within Christianity. The peculiarity of Eastern Orthodoxy in contrast to Western Christianity consists, according to Tomka, also in its greater traditionalism, i. e. the 'preservation of the traditional socio-cultural pattern, which is functional both at societal and individual respects' (2006, 256). 'Differentiation... has encroached', Tomka allows for, but the 'difference... remains' (2006, 256), meaning that modernizational differentiation has come about in Eastern Christian environments, but nothing like in Western religious culture. This does not mean only that traditionalism among the Orthodox should be higher, that in the case of Eastern Orthodoxy the two should be closer, that Eastern Orthodox piety should be permeated by traditionalism but also that there is a different relationship between these two phenomena. A good indication in this direction would be if religiosity and traditionalism formed a single factor among the Orthodox within factor analysis.

Method

Sample

In 1986 an empirical study of youth was carried out in the former Yugoslavia, targetted on youth and its values (Vrcan et al. 1986) (n=5.357). In this paper only higher education students data (n= 1.311) are considered, still enabling each confessional subsample, to meet the Stevens requirement for small samples (Stevens, 1994).

We analyzed the 1986 data again in order to compare them with post-Yugoslav conditions, for which data were gathered in all post-Yugoslav countries on student samples, by a method validated as appropriate for inter-cultural comparisons (Flere and Lavriè, 2008). (n= 2.185). In this investigation, 8 separate political entities succeeding Yugoslavia were analyzed separately, exclusively

due to their cultural specificities. This does not mean any judgment on their final political status.

Measures

Religiosity was observed in both cases by a summation of two items: on the frequency of religious attendance and on the frequency of individual prayer. At both dates these items indicated a high consistency was achieved indicating a single construct of religiosity (Alpha¹⁹⁸⁶ = .76 Alpha²⁰⁰⁹ = .67). The format of the answer in both combined items was recoded into 1-5 format (pro-trait).

Traditionalism was observed as:

- * *General traditionalism*, expressed in 1986 by the item 'Wisdom of our ancestors in many ways surpassed our present way of thinking', whereas in 2009 we applied the same item).
- * *Family traditionalism* was measured in 1986 by the statement 'Most household chores by their nature are more appropriate for women'. In 2009 a similar measure was applied, also pertaining to the relationship between spouses 'In marriage it is better that equality exists, but in principle the man should have the last word'. Both pertain to the organization of marriage and both may reflect the patriarchal traditionalism, if agreed with.
- * *Educational traditionalism* was observed in the first study by the statement 'the most important things children should learn at home is and in school is obedience', whereas in the second study the statement was of almost identical wording.
- * For the purpose of the economy of our analysis, which already takes into account two time instances, we have opted also for a *traditionalism composite* by summing the three items. There is a definite theoretical corroboration for such a step, as all items contain uncritical positive valuations of patterns of life typical of the past or considered as such. However, we did not attain the normative .6 Cronbach consistency, but only Alpha¹⁹⁸⁶ = .44 and Alpha²⁰⁰⁹ = .42, which is explicable owing to various walks of life dealt with in the respective items, and differences between males and females in the invocation of family traditionalism. Our operationalization is close to the one by Flere & Lavriè (2007), but it is more multi-faceted. Nevertheless, we attained a measure containing valid items indicative of facets of traditionalism, which are directly comparable regarding the two time instances.

Authoritarianism was observed in 1986 by a 5 item scale of Adornian items (Adorno et al. 1950). The items were: 'What youth needs most is to be found in strict discipline, ruthless resolve and will', 'What this country needs more than better laws and good programmes is a few brave, tireless leaders in which the people will believe', 'There is nothing worse than a man who doesn't feel great love, gratitude and respect towards his parents', 'Probably it will one day be proven that astrology may explain many things' and 'Never has anyone achieved anything of true worth without suffering'. The items were pro-trait worded, with a 1-4 format. Alpha¹⁹⁸⁶ = .63. In 2009 we applied the 6 pro-trait worded items by Fun ke (2005). Alpha²⁰⁰⁹ = .70. This does not enable direct comparison of magnitude of authoritarianism at two time points, but does in both cases allow for analysis of authoritarianism in relation to other constructs.

Maternal and paternal education was tapped on a 1 = (less than elementary education – 6 = postgraduate education scale in the 1986 and in the 2009 survey.

GDP and illiteracy data for 2009 were taken from the *CIA World Factbook*. They pertain to states as they are defined, a slight difference to our mode of observation. The data are thus the same for the two Bosnia and Herzegovina entities.

Procedure

We firstly analyzed descriptive data regarding traditionalism from the two surveys in order to assess some typical differences and changes within time. We tested for significance of difference in means for values between confessions, correlating them later with various constructs we were interested in. Lastly, a regression analysis was carried out for a final assessment of the need to invoke confessional variables in explanation of traditionalism as cultural values, including variables which previously proved to demonstrate significant associations regarding traditionalism items (these associations are not presented for brevity's sake). This included authoritarianism, age, gender, authoritarianism, and two macro-societal variables of GDP and illiteracy for the second time instance.

Firstly, in Table 1, we analyzed what the differences in traditionalism among the confessional groups, with a view to assessing whether value immanence could be found within the confessions, and particularly whether invariant differences among the confessions in this respect could be found, possibly shedding a light upon the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Table 1: Means and significance of differences for traditionalism items among higher education students, by confessional groups, (former) Yugoslavia, 1986 and 2009

	General traditionalism	Family traditionalism	Educational traditionalism	Traditionalism composite
Roman Catholics	3,07 ^a 3,05 ^a	3,12 ^a 1,97 ^a	3,65 ^a 3,45 ^a	3,28 ^a 2,83 ^a
Eastern Orthodox	3,13 ^a 3,10 ^a	3,60 ^b 2,30 ^a	3,88 ^b 3,56 ^a	3,54 ^b 2,97 ^a
Muslims	3,12 ^a 3,41 ^b	3,62 ^c 3,15 ^b	4,05 ^b 4,13 ^b	3,56 ^b 3,56 ^b
No affiliation	2,89 ^a 2,21 ^c	3,00 ^c 1,81 ^c	3,50 ^c 2,93 ^c	3,14 ^a 3,04 ^a
Total (ex) Yugoslavia	3,01 3,02	3,31 2,38	3,70 3,61	3,34 3,00

N 1986 = 1.311, N = 2009 = 2.156

Note: Other religious groups excluded; they were minute in number and pertained to Protestantism.

Format for all items has been transformed into 1-5, pro-trait, in cases, where it was not so. Means having different subscript letters are significantly different, by Tamhane T 2 test.

Data in Table 1 demonstrate differences between the two time points. Traditionalism as a whole has diminished in presence, which is summarily visible from the composites at the two time instances: the values fell from above normative mean to the exact normative mean. At the first time instance, traditionalism was lowest among those without affiliation, with Catholics following. Eastern Orthodox and Muslims also demonstrated similar levels. However, at the second time point, those without affiliation demonstrate clearly lowest levels, whereas Muslims always indicate highest and significantly different levels than the other groups. A clear change as to the last group is to be noted. Along with the demise of Communism, this could be, at first sight, interpreted as Muslims being/having become culturally different, on the basis of these findings. They are more traditionalist, become clearly distinct from the other groups, in the same environment, although now independent states, at this level of analysis, holding for all items observed. There is no significant difference between Catholics and Eastern Orthodox in the second time instance.

Secondly, we will pursue to the analysis by correlations between the traditionalism composite and the expected associated variables. See Table 2.

Table 2: Correlation matrix for composite traditionalism matrix and expected associated variables

	1986	2009
Religiosity ^x	.156**	.183**
Catholic affiliation ^x	.005	.144**
Eastern Orthodox affiliation ^x	.164**	.184**
Muslim affiliation	.050**	.260**
Sex	-.123**	-.215**
Parental education	-.231**	-.085**
Authoritarianism	.421**	.556**
GNP		-.259**
Illiteracy		.224**

Note: ^x = rho, as the variables are dummy variables.

Significance: ** p<.001, * p<.005.

In Table 2 we note a prevalence of significant associations in both time instances. However, Catholic affiliation did not indicate a significant association in the first instance, whereas Muslim affiliation seems to note a rise of association, although significant in both instances. Parental educational level loses some magnitude of association, still remaining significant. The change may owe to a general rise of educational level in the population. In both cases, it is authoritarianism that is very closely associated to traditionalism, which is in keeping with original Rot and Havelka findings on the close association between these two constructs in this environment (1973). Gender becomes more important, particularly owing to females rejecting family traditionalism.

The two societal variables introduced as individual traits for the 2009 data demonstrate significant associations in the direction along with modernization presuppositions.

The rationale for Table 3 was two test whether and to what extent other variables, demographic and psychological in nature can do away with the impact of the religious and confessional ones. This would mean that doing away with the impact would shed a light in favor of modernization, while its absence would support Huntington's, Tomka's, and Meštrović e tal.'s contentions of cultural essentialism. Thus there are two steps in the analysis for 1986, while for 2009 we were able to conduct a third step, introducing societal variables, indicative of modernization.

Thirdly, in the regression analyses in Table 3, religiosity is not as strong a predictor as one might expect, particularly in the latter time point, giving

support in both cases to the assessment of a secularization existing, as Voicu opines on the lack of link between religiosity and religiously normed values as a secularization indicator (2009).

Gender is a potent predictor in both time instances. Parental education is a relevant relevant predictor in 1986, whereas not now, which may be would need to be further explored.

It is authoritarianism in both time instances which predicts traditionalism exceptionally potently, even though we applied different but comparable composite measures in both cases, in both cases not including possible same items. However it is not surprising that authoritarianism is such an explanatory item. It is known to be a prevalent cultural trait in these environments (Meštrović /1994/ may not be an authority, but Rot and Havelka /1973/ are). Further, it is known that traditionalism contains the conventionalism component. But if we were to leave out conventionalism, the two other major components, authoritarianist aggression and submission, it would still leave a potent impact.

Both societal variables on literacy and GDP, of modernizational nature, proved to be strongly associated in the expected direction.

As for confessional belonging, those more knowledgeable of the former Yugoslavia would not be surprised in a low finding for the first time instance and a high one at present. A change has come about in the world view of Muslims (Ćimić 1994).

Table 3: Linear regression models in explaining traditionalism, ex-Yugoslavia 2009

	Model 1 1886	Model 2 1886	Model 1 2009	Model 2 2009	Model 3
Religiosity	.085**	.041*	,115**	,049	,043
Catholic affiliation	.099**	.049**	,055	,011	,019
Eastern Orthodox affiliation	.245**	.116**	,206**	,121**	,080
Muslim affiliation	.160**	.070**	,363**	,147**	,129**
Parental education level		-.109**		-,011	-,012
Authoritarianism		.365**		,506**	,504**
Sex		.115**		,221**	,220**
Illiteracy 2008		---			-,085*
GNP 2008		---			-,113**
R ²	5,6	21,6	10,4	37,2	37,5

Note: coefficients are betas. Significance: ** p<.001, * p<.005.

Illiteracy and GDP data are current, for the period directly preceding 2009.

For both time instances we start by the regression analysis by entering religiosity and confessional belonging. The confessional variables were constructed as dummy variables. In 1986, all confessional belongings appear as significant predictors of traditionalism. The magnitude of beta for Islamic belonging in 2009 is much greater in the second time instance. In Model 2, for both time instances, authoritarianism predominates as predictor, the significance of parental education diminished (variation of parental education diminishes), gender is significant in both cases (women being less traditionalist, particularly owing to differences regarding family traditionalism). The magnitude of explicated variance in both cases is large. For 2009, we attempted a regression analysis introducing two societal variables (as characteristics of individuals) and achieved interesting results. Both societal predictors are significant and directed as expected, diminishing the relevance of some others, thus not raising the amount of explained variance.

Thus, the potency of Islam as predictor can be considered in view of Durkheimian paradox of social stricture under conditions such as war and Stark's assertion of social conflict energizing religion (Stark and Finke 2000 239).

Modernizational variables, of which we introduced only two, observed only at the level of states (as traits of surveyed individual) prove to be sufficient to indicate the trend of value development in conformity with the general modernizational theory, without cultural essentialism. All cultures are malleable to modernizational change, not even with the necessity the notion of 'plural modernities'.

Conclusions

When observing the difference in means, one notes a drop in the presence of traditionalism in the observed period, one notes it in all groups observed, except for the Muslims, where an opposite phenomenon is noted. As for associations, all three belongings are more associated with traditionalism today than in the first time instance, but the difference is largest for Muslims. In the final step, the regression analysis, conducted in a number of modes, it is evident how traditionalism is closely linked to authoritarianism, as well as to gender (women being less traditionalist). But as to what interests us most, among confessional belongings, in 2009 in all models, Muslim belonging remains a clear predictor, whereas Catholic belonging is never so. Orthodox belonging disappears as a significant predictor in model 3, when societal variables are introduced.

We are confronted with a clear change of Islamic linkage to traditionalism, both when compared to the other two confessions and in the longitudinal view. The secularized attitude on the part of Muslims and the secularized type of Muslims seems to have disappeared. Ćimić noted that secularization was imposed upon Muslims during Communism in a particular way: their ethnic title was the confessional one (1994: 619-620). This may help explanation¹, but other influences were at work as well. As noted earlier, Bosniaks were most exposed to war atrocities. It is our opinion we are confronted by a situational constriction in the Durkheimian sense (of 'collective consciousness', which is by definition of a conservative kind), although the appearance of an Islamic immanence, as would pursue from Huntington, cannot fully be ruled out.

Religiosity itself does have a clear impact in both time situations and numerical discrepancies between the time points and models need not attract our attention at this level of analysis. The lack of a strong association between religiosity and traditionalism may be interpreted in light of M. Voicu's considering such an absence an indicator of secularization in present day Europe, noting it as such (2009). We are not in a position to speak of secularization in any of the environments, owing to the rise of religiosity, but the depth and soundness of the phenomenon is questionable, taking into account the weak association between these two phenomena, indicating a lack of allroundedness of the religious-traditionalist world view. Of course, our data are far from perfect in possibility of reliable generalization. It is possible to test most of our findings by the EVS/WVS new wave of data.

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¹ According to the 1971 Yugoslav census and later, Bosnian Muslims, speaking the (then single) Serbo-Croatian language, were allowed to declare themselves as to ethnic/national belonging as 'Muslims in the ethnic/national meaning'. After 1991 they opted for the title of Bosniak. (Miljković 1991, 46.)

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